Image Authentication using Visual Cryptography by Saranjame, Rahul & Das, Manik Lal
Image Authentication using Visual Cryptography 
Rahul Saranjame (201301101) 
DA-IICT, Gandhinagar  
201301101@daiict.ac.in 
Supervisor 
 Dr. Manik Lal Das 
 
Abstract – This report gives a novel technique of image 
encryption and authentication by combining elements of Visual 
Cryptography and Public Key Cryptography. A prominent 
attack involving generation of fake shares to cheat honest users 
has been described and a demonstration of the proposed system 
employing a centralised server to generate shares and 
authenticate them on the basis of requests is made as a 
counter to the described attack. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Overview 
Visual Cryptography was first introduced by Naor and Shamir 
where they divided a secret image into ‘n’ shares using a 
codebook which basically prescribed what each pixel in the 
share would look like according to the share in the secret 
image. This system had a major drawback of pixel expansion 
where each pixel in the secret image was mapped to an nxn 
pixel leading to expansion of the shares. Further, the 
requirement of the codebook was another downside that this 
technique had. The main advantage of Visual Cryptography as 
an encryption technique is that it renders any computation for 
decryption unnecessary. The only computational cost involved 
is in the encryption phase whereas decryption is simply 
carried out by the Human Visual System by superimposing 
the shares.  
 
Kafri and Keren first proposed the method of encryption using 
Random Grids. This eliminates the two drawbacks of the 
earlier scheme whilst retaining its computational simplicity. 
The secret image is broken down into noise like grids called 
shares that are the same size as the image. This eliminates the 
need for a codebook and does not require pixel expansion. 
The decryption process occurs by simple superimposition. 
 
Chen and Tsao further proposed the (2,n) and (n,n) secret 
sharing scheme based on Random Grids. In (2,n) RG based 
method, the image is broken down into ‘n’ random grids and 
only on the acquisition of 2 or more shares can it be 
reconstructed. In (n,n) RG based method, all ‘n’ need to be 
acquired and superimposed to recreate the secret image.  
They then came up with the novel method of (k,n) secret 
sharing which is what this project primarily uses as a basis. 
The principle remains the same: on getting atleast ‘k’ out of 
the ‘n’ shares the image can be recovered by simple visual 
detection but having ‘k-1’ or less shares reveals absolutely 
nothing about the secret image. 
 
B. Real World Context 
One of the major fields where visual cryptography has 
applications is in medical sciences where patient data 
confidentiality is of prime importance. Assuming a typical 
hospital scenario where patient records are stored on a central 
database and there is need for strict confidentiality, this 
project makes use of the (k,n) secret sharing technique to 
achieve the purpose. Each patient may have a number of scans 
and image records that are supposed to be available only to a 
certain number of doctors along with the patient. The 
technique described here incorporates elements of Public Key 
Cryptography with Visual Cryptography to thwart the attack 
later described in the report. The main reason that the attack is 
successful in exploiting the vulnerability existing in the 
scheme is due to a lack of authentication. Once such a system 
is introduced the attack can be successfully circumvented.  
 
Further a lot of computational overhead can be reduced by 
adopting the scheme discussed in the report and it also has the 
added benefit of preventing attacks that Public Key 
Cryptography is secure against. Using elements from both 
domains ensures that maximum security is provided, integrity 
is maintained and computational cost for decryption is 
negligible. 
 
The report is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief 
insight into the way shares are developed in (2,n) and (k,n) 
RG based Share Generation and describes why in the 
considered context of healthcare the need for share generation 
arises and how it is carried out. Section 3 elucidates in detail 
the attack that exploits vulnerabilities in the considered (2,n) 
and (k,n) RG based VC. It also discusses the practical 
problems of such an attack being successful and the damage 
caused. Section 4 provides a detailed illustration of the 
proposed system for preventing the attack and expounds upon 
the practical applications of the new scheme. Section 5 
concludes the report. 
 II. SHARE GENERATION 
This section elaborates on the process of share generation in 
(2,n) and (k,n) Random Grid VC. 
A. (2,n) Random Grid Share Generation 
To generate ‘n’ shares, such that any 2 are required to recreate 
the original image, the first share G1 is randomly generated. 
The next share G2 is generated such that superimposing it with 
G1 gives S. Now, G3 is also generated such that superimposing 
with G1 or G2 yields the original image S. The process is 
repeated till all ‘n’ shares are generated. 
 
Irrespective of the original image S we generate G1 by 
assigning random values 0 or 1 at each pixel location. For 
each corresponding pixel in the subsequent shares the 
following algorithm is used. 
 
Algorithm 1: 
Input: Original Image S, Randomly generated G1 
Output: Gx (x=2,3…..n) 
  
Function CreateShare(S, G1) 
for i: 1 to r 
   for j: 1 to c 
 
   if, S(i,j) = 0 (white pixel in original image) 
   Gx(i,j) = G1(i,j) 
 
   else if, S(i,j) = 1 (black pixel in original image) 
   Gx(i,j) = rand(0,1). 
 
   end 
end 
 
 
Rand(0,1) is the function that randomly assigns a value 0 or 1. 
 
 
To ensure genuine randomness of the rand() function we can 
take a generate a large number of the order of 107 and then 
take remainder on being divided by 2 as a crude measure. 
 
Figure 1 diagrammatically represents (2,n) RG based Share 
Generation. 
 
B. (k,n) Random Grid Share Generation 
The process of generating shares in (k,n) is different. The 
original image is used to generate G1 and IG1 which is an 
intermediate grid. Now IG1 is used as an image and G2 and 
IG2 are generated. This process continues till IGn-2 is split into 
Gn-1 and Gn. G1 is generated randomly and IG1 is so generated 
that superimposition with G1 gives the original image. Thus, 
subsequent shares are generated by treating the intermediate 
grids as images (as shown in Figure 2). 
 
 
C. Applications of Random Grid VC 
Extending the use of Random Grids to our example, it is easy 
to generate shares for patient records. The required scans and 
metrics for each patient are obtained and converted into a 2 
dimensional matrix. The X-rays and other scans initially 
undergo image processing to convert them into an appropriate 
grayscale format for depicting as 2 dimensional matrices. 
These are then used as the original image and divided into 
multiple shares which are distributed among the concerned 
doctors and one share is retained by the patient. 
 
III. ATTACK DESCRIPTION 
This section briefly describes the attack that can be conducted 
in Random Grid based Visual Cryptography.  
 A. Attack Mechanism in (2,3) Random Grid VC 
The initial step involves breaking down the secret image into 
3 random grids by using the algorithm given by Chan and 
Tsao for (2,n) Random Grid based Visual Secret Sharing. Let 
us assume that these random grids or shares are given to X, Y 
and Z. Further, let X and Y be the malicious users who wish 
to cheat honest Z. According to the principle of (2,3) Visual 
Cryptography, X and Y can superimpose their shares and 
reconstruct the secret image. The next step involves creating a 
fake image by altering the original secret image. Let us call 
this fake image FI. FI is then used to create a Fake Grid, FG 
that is circulated as a share. When the honest user Z uses FG 
as a share to recreate the image he does not get the original 
image but the fake image.  
The fake image is obtained by altering some of the white 
pixels of the original image to black.  
 
Supposing X’s share is G1, the following algorithm is used to 
compute each pixel of the Fake Grid FG. 
 
Figure 3 depicts the generation of the Fake Grid. 
 
 
Algorithm 2: 
Input: Reconstructed Image I, Fake Image FI, X’s Share G1 
Output: Fake Grid FG 
 
Function FakeGrid(I, FI, G1) 
for i: 1 to r 
   for j: 1 to c 
 
   if, FI(i,j) = I(i,j)  
   FG(i,j) = G1(i,j) 
 
   else,  
   FG(i,j) = rand(0,1). 
    
   end 
end 
 
B. Attack Mechanism for general (k,n) Random Grid VC 
The basic attack methodology remains quite similar to the (2,3) 
random grid VC described above. The difference lies in the 
fact that now the number of shares required to recreate the 
image is ‘k’ which means that given ‘k’ malicious users they 
can superimpose their shares and obtain the original image. 
They then proceed as earlier to generate fake grids that give 
an incorrect image on superimposition. The major difference 
is the requirement of ‘k-1’ fake shares that are required for the 
legitimate user to be cheated.  
 
C. Threat in the real world  
Furthering the aforementioned scenario of the application in 
the field of medical sciences let us analyse the attack that the 
system is susceptible to. Suppose the patient has important 
image data that cannot be exposed and is only privy to a select 
number of doctors the pre-discussed attack can be used for a 
variety of nefarious uses. Let us assume each of the ‘n-1’ (one 
share is retained by the patient) doctors are given a share and 
that on obtaining ‘k’ shares they can recreate the brain scan of 
the patient and analyse if for possible tumours. Supposing ‘k’ 
dishonest doctors come together and decide to fabricate a fake 
image that shows the presence of a tumour in an otherwise 
healthy brain they can easily do so. They simply recreate the 
brain scan, alter it and create fake shares. These on 
superimposition give the brain scan that shows false presence 
of a tumour. Such tampering of data is highly deleterious for 
the patient who will be forced to take medication that is not 
required. Further even when any of the other honest doctors 
use these fake shares they will obtain a tumorous brain scan 
and give faulty medical opinion to the patients. The major 
strength of this attack lies in the inability to trace the origin to 
its perpetrator. Once the fake shares are generated no one can 
see whether they have been tampered with or not and it is 
impossible to check who is actually an innocent user and who 
has malicious intent (Figure 2 shows how a fake image can be 
recreated by using Fake Grids). 
 
 IV. THE PROPOSED PREVENTION MECHANISM 
A new protocol that combines elements of Public Key 
Cryptography with Visual Cryptography is proposed. In an 
elementary way the technique derives its functionality from 
SSL-TLS protocols. 
 
A. SSL-TLS: An Overview 
SSL-TLS are cryptographic protocols that are widely used in a 
host of applications such as email and web browsing due to 
the provision of a secure communication channel over a 
network. These have three main properties: 
1. The data transmitted between the concerned parties is 
encrypted using Symmetric Key Encryption. The 
encryption algorithm and the keys are decided before 
the actual transmission of data starts in something 
called the handshake phase. 
2. The integrity of each message thus communicated 
can be vouched for due to the use of a MAC 
(Message Authentication Code) that can be used to 
detect the loss or modification of data. 
3. The identity of the parties communicating is 
authenticated using Public Key Cryptography. 
 
B. Share Generation and Distribution 
Share Generation is as described in Section 2 of the report. To 
make the data available to ‘n’ users but disallow recreating the 
data to fewer than ‘k’ users the image is split into ‘n’ shares 
and distributed. There exists a central server that has the sole 
function of generating shares and using a cryptographic hash  
 
function to compute digests for each of these shares. The 
server retains a copy of all these digests for each of the shares 
and additionally forwards a share and its respective digest to 
each user. 
 
C. Authentication and Image reconstruction 
Let us assume that user A wants to send his share to B so that 
B can combine their shares and obtain the image (we are 
considering a (2,n) RG based protocol here). A can certainly 
not send his share and MAC to B primarily due to the absence 
of a secure communication channel between them and also 
because of the fact that there is no way for B to check the 
integrity of the data. So all communications are routed 
through the server. 
A and S (the server) initially implement a rudimentary 
handshake protocol like the one followed in SSL-TLS. All 
handshakes make use of Public Key Cryptography to 
authenticate the communicating parties and then decide a 
session key because Symmetric Key Encryption is much 
cheaper than Public Key Encryption. Once the session key is 
established all messages are encrypted using that until it 
expires. 
Let the session key established between A and S be KAS. A 
now sends S a message indicating that he wishes to 
communicate with B. 
 
A to S: {A, B, NA}KAS 
 
S establishes a session key for A and B, KAB, and sends it to A. 
 
S to A: { NA+1, KAB}KAS 
 A now sends his share and MAC value to B for 
superimposition by encrypting it with KAB. 
 
A to B: {A, GA}KAB 
 
S now runs the handshake protocol with B and establishes a 
session key with B, KBS. Further S provides B with the A-B 
session key, KAB. S also provides B with A’s MAC value 
signed by S’s private key for ensuring integrity. 
 
S to B: {A, KAB, {S, MACA}PRs}KBS 
B now computes the MAC value for the received A’s share. 
Let us call it MAC*A. B then tallies this computed value with 
the one signed and sent by the server. If those two are the 
same it means that A’s share has not been tampered with and 
can be used for superimposition without any threat. B finally 
retrieves the image using both shares. 
 
Figure 4 pictorially represents the above described protocol. 
 
D. Security against attacks 
Contextually speaking if 2 ill-intending doctors wish to cheat 
others in a (2,n) system the attack would be thwarted by the 
defences in place. We shall see how. 
First they will go through the entire process described above 
and B will manage to recreate the image using A’s share (here 
A and B are both malicious and wish to cheat a third user C). 
Now according to the attack described they will make use of a 
fake image in place of the actual image and alter their shares 
accordingly. Let the altered shares be G*A and G*B. 
 
 
 
Now let one of them, say A, want to cheat C. A will first 
establish a session key with the server and send a request 
expressing his wish to communicate with C. 
 
A to S: {A, C, NA}KAS 
 
S will generate a session key for A and C and reply to A. 
 
S to A: { NA+1, KAC}KAS 
 
Now, A will send the altered share to C encrypted with the 
session key, KAC. 
 
A to C: {A, G*A}KAC 
 
Now the server will establish a session key with C and send 
the MAC value of A’s share (this share is unaltered since the 
server has all original copies) along with KAC. 
 
S to C: {A, KAC, {S, MACA}PRs}KCS 
 
C will now decrypt the message it received from A and 
compute the MAC value for G*A. Let that be represented by 
MAC*A.  
 
C now decrypts the message sent by S using their session key 
KCS. He obtains the MAC value for A’s share signed by S. C 
then verifies the signature to ensure S’s authenticity and the 
integrity of the MAC value. 
 
Now, the final stage involves comparing MAC*A and MACA. 
It is clearly seen that they do not match since A’s share was 
modified. C now knows that the share has been tampered with 
and does not proceed to recreate the image. 
 
Another added advantage of using this protocol is that because 
Public Key cryptography is used to establish symmetric keys 
the cost is lesser. This technique also successfully prevents 
any MITM (Man in the Middle) attacks. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this report, an innovative technique has been designed to 
prevent attacks due to generation of fake shares. This 
technique combines elements of Visual Cryptography and 
Public Key Cryptography to establish a secure channel for 
communication between the users thus preventing outside 
attacks. Further, it also introduces a system of authentication 
that helps check the integrity of the data sent. No malicious 
attacker can now exploit the system from the inside or outside. 
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